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Deng Xiaoping and other CCP leaders considered using the military from the very beginning. The citizens and students of Beijing are too naive. (Image source: Getty Images)
Students from various universities in Beijing launched commemorative activities from campus to Tiananmen Square. (Picture source: Internet picture)
On April 15, 1989, Hu Yaobang, former General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee and then member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, died of a heart attack. Students from various universities in Beijing launched commemorative activities, from campus to Tiananmen Square, and soon transformed into a student movement against official corruption, anti-corruption, and demanding political system reform. Because Deng Xiaoping and other CCP leaders characterized the student movement as “turmoil,” People’s Daily, the organ of the CPC Central Committee, published an editorial on April 26, 1989 titled “Taking a clear-cut stand against the turmoil.” On May 13, 1989, hundreds of students from various universities in Beijing went on a hunger strike in Tiananmen Square to petition. In just one or two days, the number of students on hunger strike increased to thousands, and students continued to be sent to the hospital. The emergency response triggered more than a million people from all walks of life in Beijing to take to the streets to demonstrate in support. The support activities quickly expanded to all parts of the country. This caused panic among CCP leaders such as Deng Xiaoping and others. They decided to mobilize a large number of People’s Liberation Army troops to Beijing to attack parts of Beijing (including the entire urban area of Beijing). ) impose martial law.
Nominally, the decision to mobilize troops to Beijing and implement martial law was made by the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, and then handed over to the State Council of China to promulgate martial law, and the Central Military Commission made detailed arrangements for implementation. In fact, the members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee were purely puppets, manipulated by a few CCP elders hiding behind the scenes. The final decision maker was Deng Xiaoping, then chairman of the Central Military Commission. The clues can be seen from the following relevant high-level meetings of the CCP and secret meetings of CCP elders.
On the evening of May 16, 1989, which was the third day of the hunger strike by students from various universities in Beijing in Tiananmen Square, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held an emergency meeting, attended by five members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee: Zhao Ziyang, Li Peng, and Qiao Shi, Hu Qili, Yao Yilin, as well as CCP veteran Yang Shangkun (then President of the People’s Republic of China, Executive Vice Chairman and Secretary-General of the Central Military Commission) who had the right to attend the meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Bo Yibo (then Deputy Chairman of the Advisory Committee of the CPC Central Committee director).
This emergency meeting made two decisions: first, in view of the extremely urgent situation at present, a comprehensive report to Comrade Xiaoping on May 17 was made to listen to the opinions of Comrade Xiaoping and other veteran comrades; second, it was agreed that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China General Secretary Zhao Ziyang delivered a written speech to the students on hunger strike on behalf of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. The written speech was broadcast immediately after the meeting.
On the morning of May 17, 1989, five members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Zhao Ziyang, Li Peng, Qiao Shi, Hu Qili, and Yao Yilin, gathered at Deng Xiaoping’s home. In name, they were convening a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, but in fact they were paying tribute to the contemporary Empress Dowager Cixi. Queen Mother Deng Xiaoping reported and requested instructions from Deng Xiaoping. Also present were CCP veterans Yang Shangkun and Bo Yibo.
At the beginning of the meeting, General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee Zhao Ziyang first briefly introduced the situation of the student movement, but Deng Xiaoping quickly set the tone for the meeting: “Today we are only talking about whether we should give in (to the student movement) or not?” Bo Yibo couldn’t wait. Yang Shangkun immediately made his position clear: “This is the last embankment of the dam. It cannot be retreated. It will collapse as soon as it retreats.” “Deng Xiaoping and others were so certain that even if Zhao Ziyang had different views, he would be inconvenient or afraid to express them. Even Hu Qili, who opposed the deployment of troops to impose martial law in Beijing and was eventually dismissed from his post, had to say against his will that “we can no longer retreat.”
Immediately afterwards, Deng Xiaoping proposed the idea of mobilizing troops to Beijing and imposing martial law on some areas of Beijing. He said: “After much consideration, we need to invite the People’s Liberation Army to come out and impose martial law in Beijing. To be specific, we need to implement martial law in the urban area of Beijing.” . The purpose of martial law is to resolutely stop the unrest and quickly restore order. This is the unshirkable responsibility of the party and the government. I solemnly propose it to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and hope you will consider it.”
Deng Xiaoping said that he was putting forward “personal opinions” and hoped that the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee would consider them. However, as the “Empress Dowager Cixi” of the CCP, he had absolute authority, and no one dared or could object to his opinions. As a result, the meeting immediately made four decisions: First, the meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee was continued that evening to make specific arrangements on how to implement martial law in urban Beijing; second, members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee went to the hospital on the morning of May 18 Visited the students on hunger strike who were hospitalized; third, Li Peng held a dialogue with student representatives on May 18 and asked all students on hunger strike to withdraw from Tiananmen Square; fourth, on the morning of May 18, members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee addressed the Deng Xiaoping and other senior members of the Communist Party of China reported on the deployment of martial law in Beijing.
After the meeting, Deng Xiaoping personally called the CCP veterans Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, and Peng Zhen, and instructed his secretary to call the CCP veterans Deng Yingchao, Wang Zhen, and three members of the Central Military Commission Hong Xuezhi (then a member of the Central Military Commission and deputy secretary-general of the Central Military Commission). ), Liu Huaqing (then member of the Central Military Commission and deputy secretary-general of the Central Military Commission), and Qin Jiwei (then member of the Central Military Commission and Minister of National Defense), informed them of a meeting on the morning of the second day. The briefing was actually made by Deng Xiaoping, and the CCP Arrangements for the implementation of martial law in some areas of Beijing made in the name of members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.
On the evening of May 17, 1989, members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee continued to meet. Participants included Zhao Ziyang, Li Peng, Qiao Shi, Hu Qili, Yao Yilin, five members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, and CCP veterans Yang Shangkun and Bo Yibo. The five members of the Standing Committee had different opinions on the issue of martial law and could not reach a consensus. Bo Yibo proposed a formal vote. The results of the vote were: Li Peng and Yao Yilin supported martial law; Zhao Ziyang and Hu Qili opposed martial law; Qiao Shi abstained. As soon as the vote ended, Zhao Ziyang immediately submitted a request to resign as General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, on the grounds that he had different views on martial law in Beijing and was unable to continue to perform the duties of General Secretary. Yang Shangkun felt that Zhao Ziyang’s resignation at this time would shake the situation too much, and tried his best to persuade Zhao Ziyang not to and not to resign. Zhao Ziyang finally withdrew his request to resign and took 3 days of sick leave instead.
Two decisions were made at this meeting: First, at 5 o’clock in the morning on May 18, five members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee went to Union Hospital and Tongren Hospital to visit the hunger strikers who were hospitalized. Second, the deployment of Beijing’s martial law issue reached a deadlock due to serious differences among the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. All members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee went to Deng Xiaoping’s house on the morning of the second day (May 18) to hand over the issue to Deng Xiaoping. , was deployed by Deng Xiaoping together with the CCP elders and relevant leaders of the Central Military Commission, and the final decision was made by the CCP elders.
Since then, the role of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the 13th CPC Central Committee has basically disappeared, and Zhao Ziyang, as the general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, has never participated in any decision-making process.
On the morning of May 18, 1989, CCP veterans Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, Peng Zhen, Deng Yingchao, Yang Shangkun, Bo Yibo, Wang Zhen, members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee Li Peng, Qiao Shi, Hu Qili, and Yao Yilin, and members of the Central Military Commission Hong Xuezhi and Liu Huaqing , Qin Jiwei and others gathered at Deng Xiaoping’s home for a meeting and decided to impose martial law on parts of Beijing.
This meeting made five decisions: First, martial law was implemented in some areas of Beijing from 0:00 on May 21, 1989. Second, a meeting of central and Beijing party, government and military cadres was held on the evening of May 19, 1989. Third, Yang Shangkun was responsible for immediately deploying the military’s action plan to implement martial law in urban Beijing and establishing the People’s Liberation Army’s martial law force headquarters. Fourth, inform the two veteran marshals of the People’s Liberation Army, Xu Xiangqian and Nie Rongzhen, about the current situation in Beijing, and the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Military Commission to implement martial law in urban Beijing. Fifth, in view of the current tense situation in Beijing and even across the country, a notification was immediately sent to the party committees of all provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government. The standing committees of the party committees in each province, autonomous region, and municipality must make a clear stance on the decision to impose martial law after the central government convenes a meeting of party, government, and military cadres.
Beijing citizens, including primary and secondary school students, participated in the 1989 demonstration. (Picture source: Internet picture)
The above-mentioned meetings showed that the imposition of martial law in some areas of Beijing was decided by the CCP elders. The decision-maker was Deng Xiaoping, and the specific implementer was Yang Shangkun. Deng Xiaoping and Yang Shangkun are undoubtedly the main persons responsible for the bloody suppression of June 4th.
The relationship between Yang Shangkun and Deng Xiaoping is extraordinary. Not only are they fellow Sichuan fellows, but they also had a very close relationship as early as the 1930s when the CCP established the Central Soviet regime in Ruijin, Jiangxi. After the founding of the Communist Party of China in 1949, Yang Shangkun served as the director of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee for a long time. At the 8th Congress of the CPC held in 1956, Deng Xiaoping became the general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, and Yang Shangkun served as the alternate secretary of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee and the general office of the CPC Central Committee. Director, the relationship between the two is getting closer. In 1978, two years after the collapse of the Gang of Four, Deng Xiaoping returned to politics and regained power. Yang Shangkun, who had been absent from the Chinese political stage for 12 years, also returned and gained the full trust of Deng Xiaoping. In September 1980, he was transferred to Beijing from the position of Secretary of the Guangdong Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China and was by-elected as Vice Chairman and concurrently of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. Secretary-General; in July 1981, he served as member of the Standing Committee and Secretary-General of the Central Military Commission. In September 1982, he was promoted to Executive Vice Chairman and Secretary-General of the Central Military Commission, assisting Chairman Deng Xiaoping in presiding over the daily work of the Central Military Commission; and represented the 12th Congress of the Communist Party of China held in 1982. At the General Assembly and the 13th Congress of the Communist Party of China held in 1987, Yang Shangkun was continuously elected as a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and succeeded as the Standing Vice Chairman and Secretary-General of the Central Military Commission; at the 1st Session of the 7th National People’s Congress held in April 1988 , due to Deng Xiaoping’s proposal and hard persistence, 80-year-old Yang Shangkun replaced Li Xiannian as President of the People’s Republic of China.
It can be said that Deng Xiaoping’s relationship with Yang Shangkun was close friends, while his relationship with his contemporaries Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, Peng Zhen and others was that of comrades. Although Wang Zhen followed Deng Xiaoping wholeheartedly, his relationship with Deng Xiaoping was far inferior to that of Yang Shangkun. As for Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, and Wan Li, although they were Deng Xiaoping’s three favorite generals in the 1980s, their relationship with Deng Xiaoping was more like that of apprentice and master, and it was difficult to reach the level of intimacy between Deng Xiaoping and Yang Shangkun. Because he was a close friend, Yang Shangkun could enter and leave Deng’s house at will. After Deng Xiaoping nominally withdrew from the CCP’s core circle of power, he became the messenger to convey information and communicate opinions between Deng Xiaoping and the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. Whenever the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee needed to consult Deng Xiaoping on important matters, it was communicated through Yang Shangkun.
The personal relationship between Yang Shangkun and Zhao Ziyang is also quite good. Among the five members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee at that time, Zhao Ziyang was the closest to him. This is not only because they both served as secretary of the Guangdong Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China, but also because they have the same views on some issues and have relatively close ideological views. Therefore, Yang Shangkun’s role became even more prominent in how to deal with the sensitive issue of the 1989 student movement. Although deep down he may agree with Zhao Ziyang’s proposition of dealing with the student movement, that is, solving problems on the track of democracy and the rule of law. However, once Deng Xiaoping made the decision to suppress by force, he turned to implement it with all his strength.
On the issue of suppressing the student movement in 1989, in addition to Deng Xiaoping and Yang Shangkun, Chen Yun also played a considerable role among the CCP elders. There is a record in the CCP’s internal materials: Comrade Chen Yun never backed down on major principled issues concerning the party, and he stood up fearlessly when the party and the country were in crisis. At the turn of the spring and summer of 1989, he was recuperating in other places. When a political turmoil broke out in the capital, he resolutely returned to Beijing in advance, convened a meeting of the Standing Committee of the CPC Central Committee Advisory Committee, and took the lead in proposing to resolutely support the central leadership group with Comrade Deng Xiaoping as the core; and pointed out that : “This is a critical moment and we cannot retreat. If we retreat, the socialist People’s Republic of China, which was bought with the heads of 20 million revolutionary martyrs, will become a capitalist republic.” Chen Yun was then the director of the Advisory Committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. He has high prestige within the Chinese Communist Party, and his remarks played a crucial role in calming the political turmoil. During Chen Yun’s five-year term as director of the CPC Central Advisory Committee, he only attended and chaired one meeting of the Standing Committee of the CPC Central Advisory Committee on May 26, 1989, during the student movement. According to the Chinese Communist authorities, it played a very good role in stabilizing the situation at that time.
In fact, as early as May 17, 1989, before the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee met to discuss martial law in Beijing, Deng Xiaoping had privately discussed the situation of the People’s Liberation Army troops with Yang Shangkun, and had long planned to mobilize troops to Beijing for suppression. On the afternoon of May 11, 1989, Yang Shangkun went to Deng’s house alone to report the situation. They mainly discussed the following issues: first, why this student unrest cannot end; second, why so many people support the students; third, the attitude of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee; fourth, the situation of the People’s Liberation Army; fifth, The attitude of Beijing and local governments; Sixth, what’s the next step?
During the conversation, Deng Xiaoping said: “Of course we accept the people’s demand for anti-corruption. Now when these people with ulterior motives propose anti-corruption, we must accept it as good words. Of course, this slogan is just a foil for them. Their core is to overthrow the Communist Party and overthrow Socialist system.” Then he said: “I think that among the members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, only Yao Yilin has the clearest views, the most determined attitude, and the most consistent one. Of course, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee must be decisive and dare to adhere to principles. “We will try our best to use peaceful means to resolve this student unrest.” From Deng Xiaoping’s words “We will try our best to use peaceful means to resolve this student unrest”, it can be seen that he has a plan to send troops to Beijing to suppress the student movement.
Deng Xiaoping asked Yang Shangkun: “What do you think of the handling of this student uprising in Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai?” Yang Shangkun replied: “Beijing is the most resolute in handling this student uprising. Li Ximing and Chen Xitong keep their eyes on the student uprising almost every day. “We are afraid that there will be big trouble in Beijing and we cannot afford it.”
Li Ximing was then a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the CPC, and Chen Xi was also a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and the Mayor of Beijing. The two gangs closely followed Li Peng and Yao Yilin and advocated the use of force to suppress the student movement. After Zhao Ziyang put forward the idea of ”solving the problem (student movement) on the track of democracy and the rule of law,” they tried their best to stimulate students, intensify conflicts, and prevent the situation from stabilizing. On the other hand, they repeatedly lied to Deng Xiaoping about the military situation, prompting Deng Xiaoping to make up his mind. Suppression by force. This was a key factor that led to the bloody crackdown on June 4th.
Deng Xiaoping then asked: “How is the ideological situation of the troops?” Yang Shangkun replied: “Since the outbreak of the student unrest, the General Political Department of the People’s Liberation Army has issued four consecutive notices, requiring all major military regions to conscientiously do a good job in the ideological and political work of officers and soldiers, and never interfere with local affairs. The government handles student unrest. For incidents involving vandalism, smashing, and looting that seriously affect local social stability, if local governments need the military to intervene to maintain order, they must obtain approval from the Central Military Commission. At present, the military is still very tight on political studies. The dialogue activities between officers and soldiers were very targeted and effective. The members of the leadership teams of the 7 military regions and 3 headquarters (the PLA General Staff Headquarters, the PLA General Political Department, and the PLA General Logistics Department) are in good spirits and there is no disunity. ”
On the morning of May 13, 1989, Yang Shangkun and Zhao Ziyang came to Deng Xiaoping’s home to report on the recent work arrangements of the CPC Central Committee and the Central Military Commission. After listening to the report, Deng Xiaoping expressed his position: “This student unrest has been dragged on for too long, almost a month. The old comrades are all anxious. Chen Yun, Peng Zhen, Xiannian, Wang Zhen and Sister Deng (Deng Yingchao), Including me, I am anxious. We must be decisive.” Yang Shangkun understood Deng Xiaoping’s thoughts and explained specifically about the situation of the People’s Liberation Army troops: “The thinking of the officers and soldiers is unified and highly consistent with the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission. This student uprising will not have a big impact on the thinking of the officers and soldiers.” Finally, Deng Xiaoping specifically warned: “Members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee must be decisive and adhere to principles in the face of major political issues. Of course, we must do our best to deal with this student uprising. Resolved by peaceful means.”
On the night of June 4th, the CCP troops suppressed the unarmed masses, leaving bloody corpses on the streets. (Picture source: Look at Chinese Photography, reproduced from Shi Qianyu’s book)
In the above-mentioned conversation of Deng Xiaoping, Zaidu revealed that he had always had the idea of using the army to suppress the student movement, and his decision to mobilize troops to Beijing and impose martial law on Beijing was definitely not a whim. Deng Xiaoping originally hoped to make relevant resolutions through the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, so that he could “justifiably” mobilize the army to Beijing to avoid the suspicion of “listening to politics behind the curtain.” Unexpectedly, he was resolutely resisted by Zhao Ziyang, General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee. It messed up his wishful thinking. This was the main reason why Deng Xiaoping hated Zhao Ziyang so much that he was placed under house arrest until his death.
“Army of Steel: The Military History of the Army’s 38th Group Army” revealed that on April 22, 1989, just one week after Hu Yaobang’s death, the Army’s 38th Group Army was ordered to go to Beijing to “maintain the stability of the capital.” The 1st Guard Division of the Beijing Garrison Region has also been ordered to enter urban Beijing to execute the order. It can be seen that the CCP leaders such as Deng Xiaoping and others were extremely sensitive to the safety of their autocratic rule, and considered the possibility of using the army from the beginning. In comparison, the citizens and students of Beijing seem naive.
Editor in charge: Zi Meng
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